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THE APPLICATION OF NEPA TO NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS PRODUCTION, STORAGE, AND TESTING: 
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education 
Project. 
Amy J. Sauber* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Military technology has brought us to an age of both nuclear 
and chemical weapons. The production, testing, and storage of 
such weapons by the military has resulted in significant harm to 
the environment and to public health.1 Nuclear weapons testing 
has exposed countless people to the harmful effects of radiation.2 
The wastes from chemical weapons production have contami-
nated ground water and destroyed crops.3 Air, water, and food in 
the areas where many of these activities are conducted are no 
longer safe. Many of the consequences of these activities may still 
be unknown. 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19694 (NEP A) estab-
lished a national policy that requires all federal agencies, includ-
ing military agencies, to give full consideration to environmental 
effects in planning their programs. To ensure that agencies im-
plement this policy, NEPA directs that all agencies disclose the 
environmental impact of proposed projects to the public in the 
form of an Environmental' Impact Statement (EISY;. An EIS is a 
document which describes the environmental effects of a pro-
posed project or action, and must be prepared in connection with 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. See infra text at notes 10-51. 
2. See infra text at notes 14-31. 
3. See infra text at notes 39-42. 
4. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp.V 1981). 
5. 42 u.s.c. § 4332 (1976 & Supp.v 1981). 
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all major federal actions significantly affecting the environment.6 
NEPA's disclosure mandate, however, conflicts with the needs 
of the military to prevent disclosure of military activities that 
involve the national security. The Freedom of Information Act1 
(FOIA), which NEPA incorporates by reference, protects military 
secrets by exempting properly classified national security matters 
from disclosure.8 Courts have struggled to resolve the conflict 
between the environmental goals of NEPA and the need to pro-
tect military secrets in attempting to determine the extent to 
which NEPA applies to military actions that involve issues of 
national security. In 1981, the Supreme Court addressed this 
conflict in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educa-
tion Project,9 which involved a challenge to the Navy's storage of 
nuclear weapons on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. The Court de-
cided that in this particular instance, the military was exempt 
from the mandates of NEPA. 
In analyzing the conflicting goals of NEP A and military sec-
recy, this article will first discuss the environmental effects of 
military activities that involve issues of national security. Second, 
this article will examine both NEPA and FOIA as disclosure stat-
tutes. An examination of the relevant case law involving NEPA's 
application to the military will follow. Next, the article will exam-
ine the Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Action and discuss 
the issues it leaves unresolved. The article will conclude with an 
examination of the impact of the Catholic Action decision, and a 
proposal for alternatives to achieve NEPA's goals while ade-
quately protecting military secrets. 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF MILITARY ACTIONS 
The importance of the question of NEPA's application to mili-
tary activities is illustrated by looking at the long history of grave 
environmental consequences associated with certain military ac-
tions. Both nuclear and chemical weapons are now widespread. 
While, fortunately, these weapons have not been used in warfare 
within the United States, their production, testing, and storage10 
6.ld. 
7. 5 u.s.C. § 552 (1982). 
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(I) (1982). 
9. 454 u.s. 139 (1981). 
10. Environmental problems also arise from the transportation of hazardous mate-
rials. See Hellier, Transportation of Dangerous Substances, 31 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L. J. 
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have resulted in serious environmental and health hazards for 
countless victims.u A survey of military activities which have 
caused such injuries will illustrate the extent of these environ-
mental and health hazards. 
The development of nuclear weapons testing began in the 
1940's with atomic tests in Nevada.12 Between 1945 and 1962, the 
United States government exploded over 180 nuclear devices in 
the open air at its Nevada Test siteP This testing exposed over 
400,000 military and Atomic Energy Commission personnel, along 
with an undetermined number of civilians, to radiation.14 Hun-
dreds of residents of Utah, Nevada, and Arizona communities 
downwind from the test detonation site have contracted cancer,t5 
allegedly as a result of their exposure to radiationl6• 
Between 1948 and 1958, twenty-three nuclear test blasts were 
detonated on the Bikini Atoll, part of a Pacific island chain admin-
istered by the United States after it was captured from the 
Japanese in World War lIP Before the blasts, the Bikini residents 
were moved to other islands in the chain.1s The natives were not 
allowed to return home until 1977 when the island was declared to 
be ostensibly safe.19 They were hastily evacuated, however, when 
it was discovered that the island was still dangerously radioac-
tive.20 
Enewetak, another island in the chain, was the scene of forty-
135-60 (1982); and Marten, Regulation of the Transportation of Hazardous Materials: A 
Critique and Proposal, 5 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REV. 345-76 (1981). 
11. See M. Um.. & I. ENSIGN, G.I. GUINEA PIGS, How THE PENTAGON EXPOSED OUR 
TROOPS TO DANGERS MORE DEADLY THAN WAR: AGENT ORANGE AND ATOMIC RADIA-
TION (1980); H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC SOLDIERS: AMERICAN VICTIMS OF NUCLEAR EXPERI-
MENTS (1980); R. LAPP, MUST WE HIDE (1949); S. SEAGRAVE, YELLOW RAIN: A JOURNEY 
THROUGH THE TERROR OF CHEMICAL WARFARE (1981); P. Huyghe & D. Konigsberg, Grim 
Legacy of Nuclear Testing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979 (Magazine) at 35. 
12. P. Huyghe & D. Konigsberg, supra note 11, at 70. 
13.Id. 
14.Id. 
15. For a discussion of the medical effects of nuclear testing, see Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96TH 
CONG., 2D SESS., THE FORGOTTEN GUINEA PIGS, A REPORT ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF 
Low LEVEL RADIATION SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING 
PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT 13 (Comm. Print. 1980). 
16. Hundreds of cancer victims or their survivors have since filed suit, charging that 
nuclear fallout led to their diseases and deaths. H. ROSENBERG, supra note 11, at 175. 
17. M. Um.. & I. ENSIGN, supra note 11, at 35. 
18.Id. 
19. H. ROSENBERG, supra note 11, at 168. 
20. M. UHL & I. ENSIGN, supra note 11, at 35. 
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three nuclear detonations,2t including, in 1952, the world's first 
explosion of a hydrogen bomb.22 In 1947, the United States moved 
residents of Enewatak to another island atoll so that the island 
could be used as a nuclear test site.23 The island is presently 
undergoing a $100 million clean Up.24 One island in the chain will 
never again be habitable since it is being used as a dump site for 
plutonium collected from the other islands.25 
In 1963 nuclear testing moved underground.26 Since then more 
than 300 shaft and tunnel detonations have been conducted in 
Nevada.27 In fifteen of them, a "venting" released radioactivity off 
the site, allegedly causing radiation injuries to nearby residents.28 
A 1972 action against the United States by some Utah residents 
to prevent further nuclear testing in Nevada was unsuccessful,29 
Thus, nuclear weapons testing has exposed countless individ-
uals to radiation. Some have been exposed to levels of radiation 
thought to be dangerous. Some areas exposed to radiation re-
main contaminated. Many types of cancer are known to result 
from radiation exposure.:Jl Radiation released from nuclear test-
ing can be inhaled or ingested through contaminated food con-
sumption.3t Nuclear weapons testing thus has potentially severe 
environmental and health effects. 
Weapons technology has produced not only nuclear weapons, 
but also chemical and biological weapons whose production and 
storage pose serious environmental and health hazards.32 For 
21. H. ROSENBERG, supra note 11, at 131. 
22. [d. In People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 813 (D. Hawaii 1973), the 
people of Enewetak, who at the time of the action were unable to return to their homes, 
were granted, under NEPA, an injunction with respect to further nuclear testing on 
their island. See infra text at notes 122-26. 
23. H. ROSENBERG, supra note 11, at 131. 
24. P. HUYGHE & D. KONIGSBERG, supra note 11, at 79. 
25. [d. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. An action was brought in 1972 to prevent further nuclear testing by the AEC at its 
Nevada Test Site on the grounds that the testing contravened the policies and purposes 
of NEPA. The court entered summary judgment for the AEC, ruling that the decision to 
conduct tests was not reviewable by a federal court since it involved delicate questions of 
national security. Nielson v. Seaborg, 348 F.Supp. 1369 (D. Utah 1972). See infra text at 
notes 135-39. 
30. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON 
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, supra note 15. 
31. M. UHL & I. ENSIGN, supra note 11, at 230. 
32. For an excellent overview of the environmental threat posed by chemical and 
biological weapons, see S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 11. 
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example, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, located on the edge of 
Denver's International Airport, stores 4.2 million pounds of 
deadly saren-GB nerve gas, as well as bombs filled with an even 
more potent nerve agent called VX.33 These VX-filled bombs by 
themselves are enough to kill all the residents of Colorado and 
neighboring states, along with most of the residents of nearby 
parts of Canada and Mexico.34 The proximity of the Rocky Moun-
tain Arsenal to the Denver airport increases the chances of an 
accident occurring.35 Vast amounts of nerve gas could escape if an 
aircraft were to crash into the contents of one of the arsenal's 
warehouses.36 A severe storm or earthquake could cause the same 
result.37 If inhaled, a small droplet of nerve gas would be enough 
to kill a person within minutes.38 
Not only does chemical weapons storage pose health hazards of 
an immediate, catastrophic nature, it also can have long term 
consequences such as ground water contamination. In Denver, 
for example, the Army pumped the wastes from nerve gas pro-
duction at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal into ponds to evaporate. 
It found, however, that this practice severely contaminated the 
ground water in the area, causing the pollution of the Denver 
aquifer and the destruction of crops and livestock.39 Early in 1962, 
in an effort to rectify the situation, the Army dug a 12,000-foot 
well to dispose of the wastes.40 The pumping of wastes into this 
33. S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 11, at 3. 
34.Id. 
35. Id. at 4. In 1971, a class action suit was brought by residents of the Rocky Mountain 
area and nearby areas to enjoin the storage of chemical and biological warfare agents at 
the arsenal. The court held that, in view of the needs of national security, NEPA did not 
create substantive rights in the residents to raise an environmental challenge with 
respect to the arsenal. McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (lOth Cir. 1971). See infra text at 
note 134. 
36. Id. This is the same sort of accident the plaintiffs in Catholic Action feared would 
occur since the storage site was so close to Honolulu International Airport. See infra text 
at notes 156-58. For a compilation and brief narrative of instances in which aircraft have 
crashed into nuclear weapons storage sites, see Center for Defense Information, Some 
Minor Mishaps with Atomic Bombs, 42 BUS. & SOC'Y. REV. (1982). See also Brief for 
Appellant at 14, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 
U.S. 139 (1981). 
37. See S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 11, at 4. An occurrence on Johnston Island, south of 
Hawaii, in August of 1972, indicates that the stockpiles of war poisons at Denver may at 
times be less than secure. There, the United States Air Force hastily evacuated all 
personnel from the chemical warfare depot because the depot was in the path of a 
hurricane. S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 11, at 4. 
38. Id. at 3. 
39. Id. at 23. 
40.Id. 
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well, however, triggered a series of earthquakes, some reaching a 
magnitude of 4.0 on the Richter scale.41 The ground water con-
tamination problem remains unresolved.42 Despite the potential 
immediate and long term problems, the military continues to 
store chemical weapons at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal on 250 
acres only ten miles from downtown Denver.43 
The production and testing of chemical weapons also caused 
environmental harm in 1968 at the Dugway Proving Ground near 
Salt Lake City, Utah. There, during the spraying of VX nerve 
agent as part of ongoing tests and demonstrations, an aircraft 
valve failed to close and dropped a cloud of VX droplets.44 Sixty-
three hundred sheep in the aircraft's path died, "digging spasti-
cally at the frozen ground."45 The Pentagon denied responsibility 
for more than a year.46 
At Fort Greely, Alaska, in 1966, 200 canisters of nerve gas 
stacked on the surface of a frozen lake sank through the ice.47 Six 
years later, fifty-three nearby caribou mysteriously died.48 
Wildlife experts ruled out natural causes.49 The Army refused to 
investigate, and denied that chemical agents might have been 
responsible.50 
The list of production, testing, and storage sites of chemical and 
nuclear weapons with their accompanying environmental 
hazards goes on.51 The details of these activities are generally 
unavailable because, for reasons of national security, they are 
kept secret. Because of the serious environmental and health 
hazards of these activities, however, public interest in them has 
steadily increased. Certain federal statutes require government 
agencies to disclose the environmental impacts of their actions. It 
is unclear, however, whether these statutes apply to the military 
activities just described, or whether the potential for environmen-
41. ld. 
42. ld. at 109. 
43. ld. at 280. 
44. ld. at 4. 
45.ld. 
46. ld. at 109. During a House subcommittee hearing on open-air testing of gas, the 
Army admitted that its nerve gas at Dugway killed the sheep. ld. at 264. 
47. ld. at 4. 
48.ld. 
49.ld. 
50. ld. at 5. 
51. ld. at 276. 
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tal damage from future, similar military activities must be dis-
closed. 
III. FEDERAL DISCLOSURE STATUTES 
In its mandate to federal agencies to disclose the environmental 
impacts of their actions, NEPA requires that such effects be 
disclosed "as provided by the FOIA."52 By this wholesale inclusion 
of FOIA, NEPA has also apparently adopted FOIA's exemption 
for matters properly classified as secret in the interest of national 
security.53 Therefore, the military can avoid disclosure if its pro-
posed action fits under this exemption. Thus, there is a conflict 
between NEPA's policy of disclosure of potential environmental 
threats, and FO IA Exemption 1, which prevents required disclo-
sure of certain military activities. In order to better understand 
this conflict, this section will discuss these two statutes and the 
classification procedure embodied in FOIA Exemption 1. 
A. The National Environmental Policy Act 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)54 was Con-
gress' first major attempt to establish a national policy to protect 
the quality and condition of the environment.55 The Act, which is 
composed of two titles,56 seeks to alter the attitude and posture of 
federal agencies toward environmental preservation in an effort 
to eliminate actions that would cause irreparable harm to the air, 
land, and water resources of the nation.57 Its overall environmen-
tal policy goal is to "use all practicable means and measures ... to 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(V) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(I) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The exemption for properly classified 
national security matters is Exemption 1 of FOIA. 
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The effective date ofNEPA 
was January 1, 1970. For a discussion of the legislative history of NEPA see Yarrington, 
The National Environmental Policy Act, 4 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 4-6 (1974). 
55. Previous efforts to establish a national environmental program resembling NEPA 
were unsuccessful. Prior to NEPA, several bills addressing environmental concerns 
were introduced. Among these were the Resources & Conservation Act, S. 2549, 86th 
Cong. 1st Sess. (1969); and the Ecological Research & Surveys Act, S. 2282, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1975). 
56. Title I: "Declaration of National Environmental Policy," 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 & 
Supp. V 1981) and Title II: "Council on Environmental Policy," 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1976 & 
Supp. V 1981). 
57. 115 CONGo REC. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson). 
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create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can 
exist in productive harmony."58 
In order to implement this policy, Title I imposes specific obliga-
tions on all federal agencies.59 NEPA requires federal agencies to 
consider the environmental impacts of their proposed actions, 
account for these impacts in their decision making processes, 
prepare detailed Environmental Impact Statements describing 
these impacts,60 and make these statements available to the Pres-
ident, the Council on Environmental Quality,61 and the public.62 
These statements must be prepared in connection wlth all major 
federal actions "significantly affecting the environment."63 These 
specific procedural requirements are designed to implement the 
broad, substantive policy goals of NEPA.64 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
60. An EIS is a document which describes the environmental implications of a pro-
posed project. EIS's are prepared by federal agencies in connection with "all major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The EIS must include: (1) a description of the pro-
posed action; (2) the relationship of the proposed action to land use plans, policies, and 
controls for the affected area; (3) the probable impact of the proposed action on the 
environment; and (4) any probable adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
61. See infra text at notes 65-69. 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(V) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
64. It is well established that courts can enforce NEPA's procedural requirements, 
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, 449 F. 2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (courts have the power to require agencies to 
comply with the procedural directions of NEP A which "establish a strict standard of 
compliance"). See also Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(the Navy is bound to comply with NEPA requirements with respect to its decision to 
build a support facility for the Trident submarine program). Judicial enforcement of the 
broad, substantive environmental policy of NEPA is not so clear, however. In terms of 
the practical effectiveness of an environmental impact statement, the distinction be-
tween procedural and substantive review is extremely important. The courts have not 
definitively established the scope of judicial review of agency decisions on environmental 
issues; neither the Act nor its legislative history mentions judicial review. I. ANDERSON, 
NEPA IN THE COURTS 16 (1973). 
Once NEPA's procedural requirements have been met, some cases have denied the 
right of courts to review the substance of the ultimate agency decision. Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973); National Helium Corp. v. 
Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Pizitz v. Volpe, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972); Ethyl 
Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 941 (1976); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
Another series of cases has rejected the argument that NEPA is limited to its pro-
cedural mandates and recognizes limited substantive rights created by NEPA. Calvert 
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Title II created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).65 
The role of the CEQ is to provide general advice and assistance to 
the President on the preparation of an annual Environmental 
Quality Report, to research conditions and trends in the quality of 
the environment, and to evaluate the various programs and ac-
tivities of the federal agencies for consistency with NEPA policy.66 
The CEQ is also responsible for developing and promulgating 
regulations to implement the procedural provisions of NEPA.67 
CEQ regulations have been revised several times.68 The most 
recent regulations were promulgated in 1977 pursuant to a direc-
tive from President Carter.69 
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA,70 which requires the preparation and 
disclosure of an EIS, has emerged as the most important provi-
sion of the Act because an EIS serves as the principal mechanism 
for insuring that federal agencies comply with the underlying 
policy of the Act. Section 102(2)(C) serves two functions: first, to 
inject environmental considerations into an agency's decision 
making; and second, to inform the public of the potential en-
vironmental effects of federal activities by requiring disclosure of 
the EIS. To give effect to the second function, NEPA relies on the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),71 a statute generally requir-
ing each federal agency to make its documents available to the 
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froelke, 473 F.2d 346 
(8th Cir. 1972). 
For a discussion of the disagreement among courts see Leed, NEPA of 1969: Is the 
Fact of Compliance a Procedural or Substantive Question?, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303 
(1975); Kelly,Judicial Review of Agency Decisions under the NEPA of 1969-Strycker's 
Bay Neighborhood Council Inc. v. Karlen, 10 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 79 (1982). In light 
of the disagreement among courts as to whether the substance of the EIS is reviewable, 
the question whether a publicly disclosed EIS effectively fulfills the substantive goals of 
NEPA remains unresolved. 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
66.Id. 
67.Id. 
68. The CEQ published Interim Guidelines in 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970), Revised 
Guidelines in 1971, CEQ 1971 Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971), Revised Guidelines in 
1973, CEQ 1973 Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 20549 (1973). 
69. Council on Environmental Quality: Final Regulations Implementing the Pro-
cedural Provisions ofNEPA, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978(1978) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § § 1500-1508 
(1978». See McDermott, Improving NEPA: New Regulations of the CEQ, 8 B.C. ENVTL 
AFF. L. REV. 89 (1979); Lesser, Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark: New CEQ Regulations for 
the Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 13 J. L. REFORM 367 (1980). 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). 
814 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:805 
public. Specifically, NEPA requires that an EIS be made available 
to the public "as provided by the FOIA."72 Before discussing what 
is meant by this requirement, an examination of FOIA is neces-
sary. 
B. The Freedom of Information Act 
1. Purpose and Policy 
Prior to the passage of FOIA in 1967, neither the press nor the 
public had any legal right to d~mand access to the files of the 
United States government.73 Government agencies routinely re-
jected citizen requests for information.74 The overall policy of 
FOIA is one of full disclosure of government documents.75 It was 
intended to clarify and protect the public's right to information.76 
The Act provides procedures whereby citizens may directly re-
quest a document from a federal agency.77 If denied access to the 
item sought, the citizen may resort to the courtS.78 
FOIA can be used by federal agencies, however, to prevent 
disclosure by relying on certain statutory exemptions. Agencies 
can refuse to release information if such information fits into one 
of nine specified exemptions.79 Exemption 1,80 which exempts 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(V) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
73. M. HALPERIN, Top SECRET, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNow, 47 
(1977). 
74. [d. 
75. FOIA seeks to provide access to official information and to secure a judicially 
enforceable public right to secure such information. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973). 
76. 112 CONGo REC. 13,641 (1966) (statement of Congo Moss). 
77. H. RELYEA, THE PRESIDENCY AND INFORMATION POLICY 29 (1978). 
78. [d. 
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1982). These nine exemptions include: (1) matters that are 
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept 
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and are in fact properly 
classified pursuant to such Executive Order; (2) information related solely to, the internal 
personnel rules and practices of an agency; (3) information specifically exempted from 
disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained 
from a person that are privileged or confidential; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency 
memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an 
agency in litigation with the agency; (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes; (8) information con-
tained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports by, on behalf of, or for 
the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institu-
tions; or (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning 
wells. 
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982). 
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national security matters from disclosure, is the most important 
exemption for the purposes of this article and will be discussed in 
detail. 
2. FOIA Exemption 1: The National Security Exemption 
In enacting FOIA, Congress gave little consideration to Exemp-
tion 1 for foreign policy and national defense information,8! believ-
ing simply that there must be disclosure restrictions on informa-
tion which the President has determined must be kept secret to 
protect the national defense or to advance foreign policy.82 Con-
gress linked access to information by the public under FOIA to 
the Executive branch classification system,83 established under a 
succession of Presidential orders.84 
An agency's ability to prevent disclosure under Exemption 1 
has not gone unchallenged. As early as 1971, several members of 
Congress made a determined effort to secure classified informa-
tion relating to the environmental impact of a scheduled under-
ground nuclear test in Alaska.85 President Nixon denied a request 
from Congresswoman Mink to release reports on the proposed 
test.86 When the request was denied, Mink and thirty-two of her 
colleagues in the House brought an action under FOIA to obtain 
the requested information.87 
In interpreting the meaning of Exemption 1, the Supreme 
Court in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink held that 
FOIA Exemption 1 meant whatever the Executive branch said it 
meant in any given case.88 The Court declared that Congress had 
not intended that courts review the propriety of particular 
classifications.89 The Court concluded by stating that even where 
an Executive decision to classify a document as secret appears to 
be "cynical, myopic, or even corrupt" the courts must respect it 
81. See M. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 47. 
82. HOUSE COMM. ON GoVERNMENT OPERATIONS, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE 
RIGHT OF THE PuBLIC TO INFORMATION, H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 
(1966). 
83. See H. RELYEA, supra note 77, at 67. 
84. [d. 
85. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 75 (1972). 
86. [d. 
87. [d. 
88. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
89. 410 U.S. at 84. 
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and exempt the document from disclosure under FOIA Exemp-
tion 1.90 
In the wake of the Mink decision and the release of the Penta-
gon Papers in June, 1972,91 serious Congressional concern arose 
over the abuses of Exemption 1.92 Congress therefore amended 
FOIA in the fall of 1974.93 The amendments sought, in part, to stop 
these abuses.94 Congress explicitly authorized judicial inspection 
of all classified doccuments to provide review of the propriety of 
decisions to withhold documents from disclosure.95 Subsequent 
cases have confirmed a court's right to make secret inspections of 
documents, and to make their own private determinations of 
whether information is properly classified as secret and non-
disclosable.96 
Although courts may now inspect withheld documents, the 
amended FOIA still grants the Executive branch broad discretion 
in classifiying documents.97 Exemption 1, as amended, exempts 
matters that are specifically authorized under criteria established 
by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national 
defense or foreign policy, and are in fact properly classified pur-
suant to such Executive Order.9s An examination of the classifica-
tion procedure is necessary to understand how material may be 
withheld under Exemption 1. 
a. Classification 
In order for material to be exempt from disclosure under FOIA 
Exemption 1, it must be properly classified pursuant to a Presi-
90. 410 U.S. at 95. 
91. The Pentagon Papers controversy involved a secret study ofthe Vietnam War. Its 
subsequent publication revealed the persistent deception by the Administration of both 
Congress and the public. For a discussion of the Pentagon Papers, see M. HALPERIN, 
supra note 73, at 5-40. 
92. See M. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 48. 
93. The amendments received a temporary setback when President Ford vetoed them, 
alleging that review of classification decisions by the courts to determine if those deci-
sions were properly made was unconstitutional. His veto was overridden and the 
amendments were passed. See H. RELYEA, supra note 77, at 68. 
94. Tuoni, NEPA and the Freedom of Information Act: A Prospect for Disclosure, 4 
B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 179, 184 (1975). 
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). 
96. Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Halperin v. Dept. of State, 565 
F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Phillippi v. C.I.A., 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
97. Tuoni, supra note 94, at 184-85. 
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). 
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dent's Executive Order.99 Executive Order No. 12356,100 entitled 
"National Security Information," provides, with one exception,101 
the only basis for classifying material as secret. The Order pre-
scribes a uniform system for classifying and safeguarding na-
tional security information. It confers upon specified officials 
within a federal agency the power to classify information as se-
cret if its disclosure "could reasonably be expected to cause dam-
age to the national security."l02 
Information to be considered for classification under this order 
includes: (1) military plans, weapons, or operations; (2) the vul-
nerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or 
plans relating to the national security; and (3) United States 
government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or 
facilities.1°O Additionally, it authorizes that information may be 
classified even after an agency has received a request for disclo-
sure of the information under FOIA.I04 Thus, an agency has 
broad discretion in determining how and when information is to 
be clas!;!ified. 
Moreover, in response to a request under FOIA, the agency 
may neither confirm nor deny the existence of the information if 
99. For a discussion of the history of the classification system, see Note, The National 
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1972). 
100. Issued on April 2, 1982. Exec. Order No. 12356, revoked Exec. Order No. 12065, 
which superseded Exec. Order No. 11652,37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972), which in turn super-
seded Exec. Order No. 10501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049 (1953). 
101. Exec. Order No. 12356 states that nothing in that order supercedes any require-
ment made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Exec. Order No. 47 
Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982). Therefore, the only other way for material to be properly 
classified, and thus fit under FOIA Exemption 1, is if it is classified pursuant to the 
regulations of the Atomic Energy Act. The Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976), 
declares that all data concerning the design, manufacture, or use of atomic weapons is 
"Restricted Data" and orders the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (formerly the 
Atomic Energy Commission) to control its dissemination to assure the common defense 
and security. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y), § 2161 (1976). Thus, any information regarding the 
environmental effects of the manufacturing, testing, or storage of nuclear weapons can 
lawfully be withheld by the military from the public under Exemption 1 if the NRC has 
properly classified such information pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy 
Act. 
Furthermore, as stated in the Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v .. Catholic 
Action, 454 U.S. 139, 144 (1981), FOIA Exemption 3, which authorizes the withholding of 
documents specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, arguably exempts the 
disclosure of an EIS under the Atomic Energy Act. The Court, however, found that since 
Exemption 1 was applicable, it was unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Exemp-
tion 3. 
102. Exec. Order No. 12356,47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
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such confirmation or denial is itself classifiedY15 Therefore, an 
agency cannot only refuse to give details of requested informa-
tion, but it can also refuse to say whether such information even 
exists. 
Executive discretion under the classification procedure is so 
broad, in part, because Congress has not set any standards of 
"proper" classifications under Exemption 1. Therefore, while the 
judiciary may review whether particular documents meet 
classification standards, agencies still have broad discretion in 
determining the classification standards themselves. Pursuant to 
Executive Order No. 12356, an agency is free to develop and 
implement its own classification guides to determine what in-
formation is to be classified as secretYl6 
b. Classification Guides 
Executive Order No. 12356 authorizes agencies whose officials 
have original classification authoritylo7 to determine what infor-
mation is to be classified as secret by preparing their own 
classification guides. lOs The potential shielding effect of Executive 
Order No. 12356 is thus implemented through these guides. A 
brief examinataion of the guides prepared by military agencies 
will illustrate what information may be classified as secret. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Nuclear Weapons 
Classification Guide109 which provides that the following types of 
information merit secret classification: (1) planning or construc-
tion information revealing the installation of a nuclear weapons 
storage site; (2) information revealing installation of a storage site 
for nuclear weapons, whether or not presence of weapons can be 
determined; (3) the quantity of nuclear weapons actually at a site; 
(4) storage site vulnerability studies; (5) that a particular 
Nuclear-Capable Unit actually has nuclear weapons; and (6) the 
number of nuclear weapons in storage or within a Nuclear or 
105. I d,. 
106. Exec. Order No. 12356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982). 
107. Original classification authority may be exercised only by the President, agency 
heads and other officials designated by the President in the Federal Register, and 
officials delegated this authority pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12356,47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 
(1982). 
108. Exec. Order No. 12356,47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982). 
109. Brief for Appellant at Appendix H, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii! 
Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
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Nuclear-Capable Unit yo This classification guide indicates that 
virtually all information having anything to do with nuclear 
weapons is classified. 
The Department of the Navy adopted this same classification 
scheme in its 1975 manual entitled "Navy Security Classification 
Guide for Nuclear Weapons."111 The Navy also issued a regulation 
that forbids members of the Navy to reveal any information with 
respect to the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or com-
ponents on board any ship, station or aircraft,112 The only response 
that Navy personnel may give to a request for such information 
is, "it is the policy of the United States government neither to 
confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or 
components on board any ship, station or aircraft."113 
Through these classification guides, federal agencies have 
broad power to classify information as secret. Therefore, they can, 
in effect, determine what information will be exempt from FOIA 
disclosure requirements. The same power serves to exempt in-
formation from NEPA's disclosure requirement since NEPA in-
corporates FOIA.ll4 Since many military actions do pose severe 
environmental impacts,U5 whether or not they are subject to the 
NEPA reporting requirements is significant. The conflicting need 
to preserve military secrets, however, is also important. The ap-
propriate balance between the two policies is a critical issue. The 
Supreme Court addressed this issue in Weinberger v. Catholic 
Action.u6 In order to understand the Catholic Action decision, it is 
necessary to first examine the state of the law at the time the case 
arose. 
IV. ApPliCATION OF NEPA TO MIliTARY ACTIONS BEFORE 
Weinberger v. Catholic Action 
Before the Catholic Action controversy arose in 1975, courts had 
struggled with the issue of to what extent NEPA's mandates 
applied to military activities that involved issues of national secu-
110. Id. 
111. Brief for Appellant at Appendix I, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace 
Education Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
112. Brief for Appellant at Appendix J, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace 
Education Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
113. Id. 
114. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(V) (1976 & Supp. v 1981). 
115. See supra text at notes 10-51. 
116. 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
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rity.ll7 Although courts have been reluctant to require the mili-
tary to disclose information about nuclear and chemical 
weapons,118 they have nevertheless generally agreed that there is 
no blanket, overall military exemption from NEPA,u9 
For example, in Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld,1zo which 
involved a challenge to the adequacy of the EIS prepared by the 
Navy for a Trident nuclear submarine system, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals firmly rejected the application of a 
military exemption from NEPA even though the program had 
serious national security implications.l2l The court vehemently 
condemned the Navy's argument that NEPA could not possibly 
apply to military actions as a "flagrant attempt" to exempt from 
NEPA all military actions under the "overused rubric of national 
defense."122 The court found that this effort to carve out a general 
national defense exemption from NEPA was strongly opposed by 
the clear language of the statute,123 Department of Defense and 
Navy regulations,124 CEQ guidelinesl25 and case law.l26 The court 
117. To put this problem in perspective, it should be noted that the military engages in 
countless projects that either have no significant environmental impacts, such as the 
construction of Army base housing, or have significant environmental impacts but do 
not qualify for FOIA Exemption 1, such as the dam construction projects of the Army 
Corps of Engineers. Nuclear and chemical weapons production, testing, and storage, 
however, are major military activities which undoubtedly "significantly affect the qual-
ity of the human environment." They also involve issues of national security. It is these 
activities which present the conflict between NEPA disclosure and FOIA Exemption 1. 
118. McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971); Nielson v. Seaborg, 348 F. Supp. 
1369 (D. Utah 1972); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 356 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972). 
119. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
McQueary v. Laird,.449 F.2d 608, 612 (10th Cir. 1971); Greene County Planning Bd. v. 
Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 1972); Envt'l Defense Fund v. 
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 294 (8th Cir. 1972); Envt'l Defense 
Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 468 F.2d 1164, 1173 (6th Cir. 1972); Bradford Township v. 
Illinois State Toll Auth., 463 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1972); Zabb v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199,211 
(5th Cir. 1970); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 786 (D. Me. 1972); 
Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F. 2d 817, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
120. Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F. 2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
121. Id. at 823. 
122. Id. 
123. The court referred to § 102 of NEPA that instructs all federal agencies to comply 
with NEPA's requirements. Id. at 823. 
124. The court pointed to Department of Defense regulations 32 C.F.R. § 214.1-2 (1983): 
"This part 214 reiterates and amplifies DOD policy, responsibilities, and procedures for 
assessing the environmental impact of Defense actions ... as required by NEPA ... The 
provisions of this Part 214 apply to ... the Military Departments ... and Defense 
Agencies." 555 F.2d at 823. 
125. Referring to 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4(a) (1975), the court found that: "The phrase 'to the 
fullest extent possible' in Section 102 is meant to make clear that each agency of the 
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ordered the Navy to correct the deficiencies in its EIS.127 
Similarly, in People of Enewetak v. Laird,128 the District Court of 
Hawaii held that the section 102(2)(C) EIS requirement applied to 
the atomic tests conducted on Enewetak, a Pacific island used 
extensively in the past for test detonations.129 The DOD argued 
that the core drilling, which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin, had no 
appreciable effect on the environment, and that an EIS, there-
fore, was unnecessary.130 The court, however, reasoned that such 
drilling was only a segment of the entire project of testing nuclear 
weapons.131 It therefore concluded that since the primary purpose 
of the drilling was to further the project, which itself had poten-
tially significant environmental consequences, the drilling too 
was subject to NEPA.I32 
On the other hand, some courts, in holding that NEPA does not 
apply to a challenged military activity, despite significant envi-
ronmental consequences, have granted such activities broad pro-
tection from disclosure.l33 McQueary v. Lairdl34 involved a chal-
lenge to the storage of chemical warfare agents at the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal. In holding that preparation of an EIS was not 
required since public disclosure would create serious problems of 
national security, the Tenth Circuit Court found that the federal 
government possesses "unfettered" control over federal military 
establishments.l35 
Similarly, in Nielson v. Seaborg,1aJ) which involved the Atomic 
Energy Commission's (AEC's)137 Nevada nuclear tests, plaintiffs 
Federal Government shall comply with that section unless existing law applicable to the 
agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes compliance impossible." 555 F.2d at 
823. 
126. The court cited the following cases: Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mor-
ton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 
463 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir.1971); People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 
1973). 
127. 555 F.2d at 830. 
128. People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973). 
129. Id. at 821. 
130. Id. at 820. 
131. Id. 
132. I d. at 821. 
133. See supra note 118. 
134. McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971). 
135. Id. 
136. Nielson v. Seaborg, 348 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Utah 1972). See supra text at notes 26-29. 
137. Under the provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. § 5801 
(1976 & Supp. V 1981), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) replaced the AEC as 
the licensing and regulatory authority for the AEA. 
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sought to enjoin the tests on the ground that the tests con-
travened the policies and purposes ofNEPA.l38 The Utah District 
Court held that the tests were totally within agency discretionary 
weighing of other essential considerations of national policy.l39 
The District of Columbia took a middle ground on the question 
of NEPA's application to national security matters in Calvert 
Cliffs' Coordinating Commission v. United States Atomic Energy 
Commission. l40 The case involved a challenge to the Atomic 
Energy Commission rule that environmental factors need not be 
considered unless affirmatively raised by outside parties or staff 
members. Plaintiffs claimed that such a rule did not comply with 
NEPA. The court agreed, holding that section 102 duties must be 
complied with "to the fullest extent possible" unless there is a 
clear conflict of statutory authority.l4l 
The most protracted litigation on NEPA's application to na-
tional security matters concerned "Project Cannikin," the 1971 
underground test detonation of a five-megaton nuclear warhead 
beneath Amchitka, an island off the coast of Alaska.l42 The AEC, 
assuming that NEPA applied to the test, prepared both a draft 
and a final EIS for the testing. The Committee for Nuclear Re-
sponsibility, Inc., a committee of eight environmental and conser-
vation groups, challenged the adequacy of the statement, primar-
ily based on a series of secret studies prepared by the government 
and not included in the NEPA review process. The circuit court 
ordered some of the studies to be made public late in the litigation. 
These studies indicated that a more severe environmental threat 
existed than the Commission's EIS indicated. 
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, the challenge 
to "Project Cannikin," came before the district and circuit courts 
138. 348 F. Supp. at 1372. 
139. [d. 
140. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
141. [d. at 1115. By adding the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" to § 102, the joint 
House-Senate Conference Committee to the NE P A bill addressed the issue of particular 
agency exemptions: "The purpose of the new language is to make it clear that each 
agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in such 
sub-paragraphs A through H unless the existing law applicable to such agency's opera-
tions expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible ... 
No agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of existing statutory au-
thorizations to avoid compliance." H.R. REP. No.765, 91sT CONG., 1ST SESS. 9-10 (1969). 
142. See Comment, Project Cannikin and the NEPA, ENVTL. L. REP. ENVTL. L. INST. 
10,161,10,162 (1971). See also supra text at notes 84-90 for a discussion of EPA v. Mink, 
410 U.S. 73 (1973), a case which also grew out of the Project Cannikin controversy. 
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three timesl43 before an appeal requesting an injunction was de-
nied by the Supreme Court.t44 Although the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court denied injunctive relief because of the potential 
harm to national security that a delay would cause, it rejected the 
AEC's claim that NEPA did not apply in this situation.l45 The 
court made it clear that the plaintiffs could still pursue and might 
yet prevail on their claim that the AEC had failed to comply with 
NEPA.l46 
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial ofinjunc-
tive relief without providing a written opinion to explain its rea-
sons.147 Consequently, the litigation did not resolve questions 
about NEPA's application to national security matters.148 It is 
interesting to note, however, that the Court agreed to hear the 
case under extraordinary time demands and somewhat excep-
143. Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783; 463 F.2d 788; 463 F.2d 
796 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The district court decisions were not reported. 
144. Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971). 
145. 463 F.2d at 791. 
146. Id. at 798. 
147. 404 U.S. 917 (1971). 
148. An additional issue left unresolved by the Comm.for Nuclear Responsibility cases 
is the practical effectiveness of an EIS in terms of judicial relief. If a court were to review 
an agency's decision and find an EIS to be inadequate or defective, it is unclear what 
judicial relief is available. In Comm.for Nuclear Responsibility, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals denied a request to temporarily enjoin an underground nuclear test 
blast even though, as the court conceded, substantial doubt existed as to the adequacy of 
the EIS prepared by the AEC for this test blast. Comm. for Nuclear Resp. v. Seaborg, 463 
F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1971). According to the circuit court, the potential harm to 
national security and foreign policy that might result from postponement of the test 
outweighed the existing evidence of possible environmental harm. 463 F.2d at 798. The 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the circuit court's denial of injunctive relief. Comm. 
for Nuclear Resp. v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971). 
Justice Douglas, in a written opinion, dissented from the Supreme Court's decision 
denying the injunction. As authority for judicial review of impact statements, he relied 
on Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC, 449 F. 2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which held that: "if the decision 
under NEPA was reached by AEC procedurally without individualized consideration and 
balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in good faith-it is the respon-
sibility of the courts to reverse." Id. at 1115. Justice Douglas went on to conclude that 
once noncompliance with NEPA is shown, the federal courts have uniformly held that 
injunctive relief is appropriate. 404 U.S. at 921. Courts have consistently held, he found, 
that a defect in the EIS presents a justiciable question and provides a basis for equitable 
relief.ld. citing West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 
232 (4th Cir. 1971); Envtl. Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng. of U.S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 749, 
759 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D. D.C. 1970). 
The majority, however, disagreed, and despite the circuit court's finding that the 
AEC's EIS presented a substantial question as to the legality of the proposed test under 
NEPA, denied injunctive relief, and the test was conducted on schedule on Saturday, 
November 6, 1971. See also supra note 54 for a discussion of the related problem of 
procedural versus substantive agency compliance with NEPA. 
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tional circumstances.l49 By having done this, the Court seemed to 
indicate that any attempts to circumscribe the NEPA require-
ments raises significant legal and policy issues. This was the 
rather confusing state of the case law involving NEPA and na-
tional security matters when the case of Weinberger v. Catholic 
Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Projectl50 reached the Supreme 
Court in 1981. 
V. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education 
Project 
A. The Controversy 
In 1975, the Navy decided to transfer weapons stored at various 
locations on the island of Oahu, Hawaii to the West Loch branch 
of the Lualualei Naval Magazine. The transfer required construc-
tion of additional facilities at the weapons storage site. Pursuant 
to CEQ guidelines151 and DOD regulations,152 the Navy prepared 
an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). An EIA is a pre-
liminary screening device used to determine whether or not a full 
scale EIS is necessary.153 The Navy's EIA made no mention at all 
of nuclear weapons storage and only discussed the construction 
aspect of the project. It concluded that the necessary construction 
149. The plaintiff groups were permitted to appear before a special Saturday session of 
the Court at 9:30 A.M., November 6, 1971, requested by the Chief Justice just hours 
before the scheduled test blast. They challenged a major nuclear test of allegedly vital 
national security importance which Congress had debated and President Nixon had 
personally ordered to go ahead. Comment, Project Cannikin and the NEPA, supra note 
142, at 100, 162. 
150. 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
151. § 1501.4 CEQ guidelines provide that when it is difficult for an agency to deter-
mine the extent of the environmental impact of its proposal, the agency shall prepare an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA). Based on the EIA, the agency shall make its 
determination whether the environmental impact is or is not significant. If it is con-
cluded that significant environmental impact will result from a proposed action, a draft 
EIS must be prepared. In those projects which normally would require an EIS, if an EIA 
concludes that the environmental impact is not significant, then a finding of no sig-
nificant impact (FONS!) must be prepared and made available to the public. If the 
proposed action does not normally require an EIS and the EIA concludes that no 
significant impact will result, the agency need not prepare a FONSI, but must just file 
and make public the EIA. For a discussion of the EIA, EIS, and FONSI, see R. JAIN, 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 24-26 (1981). 
152. 32 C.F.R. § 2.14.6 (1981). This section requires an assessment of environmental 
consequences. Only if it is determined that the proposal will significantly affect the 
environment is an EIS required. The EIS must then be submitted with the proposal. 
153. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1981). See supra note 152. 
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of additional facilities at a site where conventional weapons had 
been stored for twenty years would have no significant environ-
mental impact. The EIA, therefore, concluded that an EIS need 
not be prepared, and construction subsequently began. 
In 1978, the Navy prepared a separate "candidate" EIS, a 
statement that the Navy regulations require prior to a formal 
EIS.l54 The candidate EIS, entitled "Nuclear Aspects of Naval 
Systems Storage," discussed, without reference to any specific 
storage site, the hazards connected with the storage of nuclear 
warheads. The report concluded that "the handling, storage, and 
transportation of nuclear weapons present no hazards to the 
environment."l55 This candidate EIS neither made reference to 
any specific storage site, nor discussed the potential dangers in-
volved. 
B. Lower Court Decisions 
In 1979, several Hawaii based environmental groups and indi-
viduals brought an action in federal district court against the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of 
Naval Operations, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, 
154. Navy regulations establish a series of steps to be followed in determining whether 
an EIS should be filed. A brief EIA must be prepared for any action that may have 
environmental effects. If it appears from this assessment that the action may have a 
significant environmental impact, a Candidate EIS must be prepared, following the 
same format and covering the same issues as a formal EIS. The Candidate EIS is 
reviewed by a panel in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, which decides whether an 
EIS is required. City and County of San Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 500 (9th 
Cir. 1980). Since the Navy had concluded in its EIA of 1975 that the new Lualualei Naval 
Magazine facility would have no significant impact on the environment and therefore 
concluded that there was no need to prepare an EIS, it is unclear why they prepared 
their Candidate EIS in 1978. Its reasons for doing so were not discussed in any of the 
decisions, but at least one commentator has surmised that it was prepared as a final 
effort to pacify the plaintiffs in the case. DeBois, The Supreme Court Deals a Severe Blow 
to NEPA, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 699, 701 n.19 (1982). 
155. Brief for Appellant at Appendix G, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace 
Education Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). The candidate EIS, in its conclusion, further 
stated that "low level radioactive emissions from nuclear warheads are sufficiently low 
to pose no threat to the environment or to personnel health and safety, and therefore, 
the nuclear aspects of weapons storage do not constitute an 'environmental factor' per 
se, and can be excluded from any assessment prepared under the NEPA that addresses 
the conventional or construction aspects of storage handling facilities." Its final conclu-
sion simply stated: "Probable Adverse Environmental Effects Which Cannot be Avoided: 
None." ld. 
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and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.156 The plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin the construction at West Loch until the Navy 
prepared an EIS,157 In support of their demand, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the Navy's EIA and candidate EIS ignored both the 
risk of a nuclear detonation caused by an aircraft crash into the 
storage facility and the potential environmental effects of such an 
accident.158 The plaintiffs further alleged that the Navy had failed 
to consider the effects of the continued release of low level radia-
tion from the storage of nuclear weapons near populated areas.1OO 
Even though the Navy had stipulated that the West Loch 
facility was capable of storing nuclear weapons/60 they contended 
that Navy regulations prohibited it from either admitting or de-
nying that plans existed to store nuclear weapons at West Loch.161 
The Navy claimed that it therefore was precluded from the prep-
aration of an EIS with respect to the storage of nuclear weapons 
at West Loch. 
The district court agreed that the construction and use of the 
storage facilities at West Loch constituted a major federal action 
and therefore was subject to NEPA requirements.l62 The court 
156. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project v. Brown, 468 F. Supp. 190 (D. 
Hawaii 1979). 
157. The plaintiffs contended that the candidate EIS did not satisfy the requirements 
of NEPA since it ignored four environmental factors: (1) the risk of nuclear accidents; (2) 
the enhancement of that risk by the physical proximity of airports; (3) the effects of any 
nuclear accident upon the surrounding population and environment of Hawaii; and (4) 
the effects of continual low level radiation from the storage of the weapons near popu-
lated areas. They contended that since the candidate EIS was not site-specific, it could 
not supply information about any of these factors. Catholic Action, 643 F.2d at 571. 
158. Plaintiffs offered and defendants stipulated to several examples of aircraft mis-
haps and other accidents involving nuclear weapons. On January 17, 1966, an American 
B-52 bomber collided with a KC-135 refueling tanker causing the deaths of crewmen and 
the loss of unarmed nuclear weapons. On March 11, 1958, a B-47 bomber accidentally 
dropped an unarmed nuclear weapon in the megaton range over South Carolina. An 
explosion of conventional explosives occurred. On June 7, 1960, at McGuire Air Force 
Base, a fire occurred at a launch shelter of a Bomarc Missile. One missile exploded. Some 
radiation was scattered. On January 21, 1968, a B-52 attempting an emergency landing 
at a United States Air Force Base in Greenland, crashed, breaking or destroying nuclear 
weapons. A radioactive contaminated area resulted. 
159. See supra text at note 3. 
160. Stipulation of March 4, 1979. Brieffor Appellant, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of 
Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
161. See supra text at note 113. 
162. Catholic Action v. Brown, 468 F. Supp. at 192-93. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA 
requires that agencies prepare an EIS for all "major federal actions significantly affect-
ing the environment." This phrase suggests that actions first have to be found to be 
"major" and then, must also be found to have potentially "significant" environmental 
affects. Anderson, supra note 64, at 89. 
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concluded, however, that the Navy had complied with NEPA "to 
the fullest extent possible" and therefore had discharged its stat-
utory duty.163 Complete compliance with NEPA, according to the 
court, was not possible where an EIS would necessarily involve a 
discussion of the presence, number, and location of atomic 
weapons, as well as the design and capabilities of such weapons 
and related security measures.164 To discuss this information 
would conflict with the restrictions of the security regulations of 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the classification 
guides of the DOD and the Navy.165 The district court, therefore, 
denied the plaintiffs' request for an injunction. 166 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court 
decision.167 While accepting the Navy's argument that it could not 
possibly disclose information regarding the presence or absence of 
nuclear weapons at West Loch without violating the security 
regulations of the NRC, the court did not agree that EIS prepara-
tion was precluded, and ordered the Navy to prepare one.168 The 
court reasoned that an EIS could hypothesize, without conceding, 
that the facilities would store nuclear weapons and that the EIS 
need not imply that a decision to store had been made or reveal to 
the public specific information regarding nuclear weaponsYll 
Relying on the District of Columbia Circuit Court's decision in 
Concerned about Trident v. Rumsfeld,170 the court found that in 
order for an EIS to be sufficient, it must discuss the environmen-
tal consequences of both the construction of a project and the 
operation of the facility.l71 The Court also found that since the 
Navy had already conceded that the facility was nuclear capable, 
an EIS that discussed the consequences of storing nuclear 
weapons would not violate any national security policies or regu-
lations, and would fulfill NEPA requirements.172 The court rea-
soned further that the preparation of a hypothetical EIS would 
provide assurance to the public that the Navy had considered the 
environmental effects of nuclear weapons storage and handling 
163. 468 F. Supp. at 192. 
164. [d. at 193. 
165. [d. See supra text at notes 107-16. 
166. 468 F. Supp. at 193. 
167. Catholic Action, 643 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1980). 
168. [d. at 572. 
169. [d. at 57!. 
170. See supra text and note 120. 
171. 643 F.2d 569. 
172. [d. at 572. 
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should the Navy decide in the future to use West Loch for that 
purposepa 
C. Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in April, 1981 to settle 
the important issue of the relationship between national security 
and NEPA. In a unanimous decision,174 the Supreme Court re-
jected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and conclusion, and reversed 
the decision of the Circuit Court. In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist 
relied on two factors to find that the Navy was not required to 
prepare or disclose an EIA: first, FOIA Exemption 1 exempts the 
Navy from NEPA requirements in this instance;l75 and, second, 
an EIS is not required when an action is merely contemplated, 
only when an action is proposed.176 
As to the first factor, the Court initially noted that the public 
disclosure function of the EIS requirement is expressly con-
strained by FOIA.177 Finding that "virtually all information relat-
ing to the storage of nuclear weapons is classified,"I78 the Court 
concluded that whether or not nuclear weapons are to be stored 
at West Loch is a question exempt from disclosure under FOIA 
Exemption 1, which exempts all properly classified information. 
Therefore, Justice Rehnquist concluded, even if an EIS had been 
prepared in this case, there would have been no requirement of 
disclosure.l79 
The second factor relied on by the Court led to the finding that 
the Navy need not even prepare an EIS.I~ Relying on Kleppe v. 
173. [ d. Neither the district court nor the circuit court explicitly referred to FO IA in 
its decisions. They referred to it only indirectly by addressing the conflict between 
NEPA's preparation and disclosure mandates, and the security provisions of the AEA 
and security classification guides. These security provisions, however, are a basis for 
nondisclosure only within the context of FOIA Exemption 1. It is unclear why neither 
lower court made any reference to FOIA Exemption 1; presumably they simply ne-
glected to track the process through which nondisclosure is effectuated. 
174. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Burger, 
White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. 454 U.S. at 140. Justice 
Blackmun filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. 454 U.S. at 147 
(Blackmun J., concurring). 
175. 454 U.S. at 146. 
176. [d. 
177. 454 U.S. at 143. 
178. [d. at 144. 
179. [d. at 146. 
180. The DOD's regulations, however, do not excuse the agency from NEPA's re-
quirement of EIS preparation. They say that "the fact that a proposed action is of a 
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Sierra Club,t81 which held that an EIS need only be prepared 
when a project is proposed, but not when a project is merely 
contemplated,t82 the Court concluded that the Navy is not re-
quired to prepare an EIS simply because a facility is "nuclear 
capable."I83 A statement that the facility is 'nuclear capable' indi-
cates only that the Navy has contemplated the possibility that 
nuclear weapons may, at some time, be stored there. Only a 
proposal to store nuclear weapons at West Loch would trigger the 
EIS preparation requirement.I84 Since the Navy is forbidden by 
Navy regulations1&,; from either admitting or denying that it pro-
poses to store nuclear weapons at West Loch, the Court held that 
"it has not been and cannot be established that"l!11 the Navy has 
made a proposal. Therefore, even the preparation of an EIS is not 
required by NEPA. Interestingly, the court then concluded that 
"ultimately whether or not the Navy has complied with NEPA ... 
is beyond judicial scrutiny in this case."I87 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice 
Brennan, found that the applicable law was "relatively simple 
and straightforward."lss He found that it was unnecessary to rule 
that the Navy's compliance with NEPA was beyond judicial 
scrutiny, or to address the applicability of FOIA case law.1!11 Jus-
tice Blackmun agreed with the majority that the Navy need not 
publish an EIS if disclosing its contents or even its existence 
classified nature does not relieve the proponent of the action from complying with 
NEP A," but in such circumstances, the EIS "shall be prepared, safeguarded and dis-
seminated-in accordance with the requirements applicable to classified information." 
181. 427 U.S. 390, 405-06 (1976). 
182. The rationale behind this distinction is that contemplated actions often do not 
result in actual proposals. Therefore, to require an EIS for every contemplated action 
would lead to many unnecessary EIS's and impose an unnecessary burden on agencies. 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976). 
183. 454 U.S. at 146. 
184. Id. 
185. See supra text at notes 111-12. 
186. 454 U.S. at 146. 
187. Id. Justice Rehnquist relied on Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875), and 
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) to reach this conclusion. These cases held 
that public policy forbids the maintenance of a suit whose trial would lead to the 
disclosure of matters that the law regards as confidential. 
188. 454 U.S. at 147. 
189. Id. at 149. Justice Blackmun was referring to Rehnquist's reliance on NLRB v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1975); Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185-86 
(1980); and Kissinger v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136, 152 (1980), which Justice 
Rehnquist used to support the Court's holding that FOIA governs NEPA's disclosure 
requirements. 
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would reveal properly classified materials.1OO He reasoned, how-
ever, that even though DOD and CEQ regulations provide that 
classified information may be restricted from public disclosure, 
they do not suggest that classified proposals are exempt from EIS 
preparation.191 He found that the Navy must prepare an EIS on 
all proposals for major federal actions significantly affecting the 
environment, and that NEPA does not provide an exception for 
classified proposals.192 Nevertheless, he concurred in the Court's 
result because the plaintiffs had failed to establish the existence 
of a proposal, and thus the need for an EIS.193 
The Supreme Court in Catholic Action held that when military 
activities involve properly classified national security informa-
tion, such information need not be revealed. Further, the Court 
ruled, where an agency cannot, due to national security reasons, 
admit or deny the existence of a proposal, the agency need not 
prepare an EIS because the very existence of the action trigger-
ing the need for the EIS is "beyond judicial scrutiny." For the first 
time, the Court considered the relationship between military sec-
recy, the FOIA, and NEPA. The decision will have a significant 
impact on the law in this area, but it still leaves some issues 
relating to NEPA's application to military actions unresolved. 
D. Analysis 
To understand the impact of the Court's decision in Catholic 
Action, it is necessary to analyze the decision in terms of when 
EIS preparation is required, when EIS disclosure is required, and 
when both or neither are required. In the Catholic Action situa-
tion, the Court held that military agencies are exempt from both 
EIS preparation and disclosure. The threshold question in a 
Catholic Action type of situation is whether the mere existence of 
the proposal can be admitted or denied without revealing prop-
erly classified information. If it cannot, then the question of 
NEPA compliance is "beyond judicial scrutiny."194 No EIS need be 
prepared, and any lawsuits brought to force preparation of an 
EIS will be dismissed. 
The number of actual Catholic Action situations-where even 
190. 454 u.s. at 148. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 150. 
194. Id. at 146. 
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the existence of a project or activity cannot be disclosed-may 
not be very significant. In order to be so protected, the project 
must be one which is both secret and hidden from public view. 
Otherwise, the DOD could not claim that its existence could not be 
admitted or denied. Situations where the mere existence of a 
proposal is unknown are likely to be very rare.1OO In most major 
military endeavors, at least those likely to result in significant 
environmental effects, the action simply cannot be hidden from 
public view.1OO The proposal will either be disclosed in defense 
appropriations, will be the subject of public controversy, or will be 
so physically obvious that the DOD could not reasonably claim an 
inability to admit or deny its existence.197 In these cases, NEPA 
requires that an EIS be prepared even though it touches on 
military secrets. When nonclassified information is segregable 
from classified materials, it must be disclosed.198 
In those rare cases in which an agency's compliance with 
NEPA is "beyond judicial scrutiny," the Catholic Action decision 
does not clearly indicate when an "internal EIS," one prepared 
but not disclosed,199 is required. As the concurrence in Catholic 
Action noted, Justice Rehnquist "rather obliquely" stated that if 
the Navy proposes to store nuclear weapons, both DOD regula-
tions and NEPA require the preparation of an "internal EIS."200 
Where even the existence of a project or activity is secret, it will 
be deemed to be "contemplated," not "proposed," and even an 
internal EIS need not be prepared. As a practical matter, of 
195. Comment, Nuclear Weapons and Secret Impact Statements, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,007, 10,011 (1982). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(c) (1981). This CEQ regulation provides that EIS's be organized 
so that unclassified portions can be made available to the public. 
199. The Court may not have ordered the preparation of an internal EIS in this case 
because of the nature of the circuit court's holding. Perhaps if the Ninth Circuit had not 
invented a hypothetical EIS, and had instead confined its holding to the statutory 
provisions of NEPA, the Supreme Court would have ruled differently. Justice Rehnquist 
concluded that the hypothetical EIS was "a creature of judicial cloth, not legislative 
cloth," 454 U.S. at 141, and not mandated by NEPA since such a requirement "departed 
from the express intent of Congress manifested by the explicit language in Section 
102(2)(C)." 454 U.S. at 144. If the Ninth Circuit had required the preparation of an EIS for 
internal use only, the Supreme Court might have affirmed the decision. This decision 
would still have failed to provide for any mechanism for enforcing the requirement of 
EIS preparation or for ensuring that the Navy had in fact considered environmental 
factors in its decisionmaking. It would, however, have prevented a total circumvention of 
NEPA requirements in this case. 
200. 454 U.S. at 147. 
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course, an "internal EIS" screens out the public from the NEPA 
process altogether. Further, lawsuits alleging the failure to pre-
pare an EIS would apparently be dismissed as "beyond judicial 
scrutiny." The utility of an internal EIS requirement, therefore, is 
quite limited. 
Even though Catholic Action does not necessarily sanction a 
broad, national security exemption from NEPA,201 the decision 
creates a unique dilemma. In Catholic Action, the Navy's action 
can never be viewed as a "proposal" and thus trigger the need for 
an EIS because the Navy need not ever admit the actual storage 
of nuclear weapons at the West Loch site. Therefore, the Navy 
would never be required to prepare an EIS, even if nuclear 
weapons were stored there in the future. The basic premise of the 
contemplation/proposal distinction, however, is that an EIS will 
be required when a proposal is actually made.202 Under the 
Catholic Action decision, however, the Navy could actually store 
nuclear weapons at West Loch without ever having to prepare an 
EIS, because the action would never even rise to the level of a 
proposal. Justice Rehnquist applied the contemplation/proposal 
distinction in a context quite different from the types of situations 
to which the distinction had previously been applied.203 The dis-
tinction was created to address the situation in which contem-
plated actions do not result in actual proposals.204 To require an 
EIS for every contemplated action would lead to unnecessary 
EIS's and impose an undue burden on federal agencies.205 Justice 
Rehnquist seized on this distinction and stretched it in order to 
apply it to the Catholic Action situation, even though it was clear 
201. A district court in California, however, relying exclusively on the Catholic Action 
decision, recently refused to order the Navy to prepare an EIS for a nuclear capable 
weapons storage facility in Southern California. In Laine v. Weinberger, 541 F. Supp. 599 
(C.D. Cal. 1982), the court found Catholic Action to be absolutely controlling with respect 
to nuclear weapons. In that case, as in Catholic Action, a group of neighborhood citizens 
concerned about the possible presence of nuclear weapons at Seal Beach Weapons 
Station sought an injunction to stop the storage of nuclear weapons there. The plaintiffs, 
however, were unable to establish that the Navy had proposed to store nuclear weapons 
there, and thus, the court found, the EIS preparation requirement was not triggered. 
202. Justice Rehnquist had found that "if the Navy proposes to store nuclear weapons 
at West Loch, the DOD's regulations can fairly be read to require that an EIS be 
prepared solely for internal purposes." 454 U.S. at 146. Justice Blackmun, in his concur-
rence, echoed this finding, stating that, "in fact, the DOD regulations explicitly declare 
that the fact that a proposed action is of a classified nature does not relieve the 
proponent of the action from complying with NEPA." 454 U.S. at 147. 
203. See supra note 182. 
204. [d. 
205. [d. 
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that the Navy, by actually building nuclear weapon storage 
facilities on its site, had gone well beyond the contemplation stage 
of its decision. The distinction was originally intended to prevent 
unnecessary EIS's; it was not intended to be used as a shield to 
prevent preparation and disclosure. 
The effective holding of Catholic Action is that, where FOIA 
permits the existence of an agency's actions or even an entire 
project to be kept secret, an EIS is not required, even for internal 
agency use. The action can occur without consideration or disclo-
sure of environmental factors. Given the potential hazards of 
storage and handling of nuclear weapons described above,206 al-
lowing an agency to take such action without even prior consid-
eration of its potential environmental consequences may seri-
ously undermine the goals of NEPA. This may, in fact, be the 
result desired by Congress when it enacted NEPA. In striking a 
balance between environmental disclosure and military secrecy 
in favor of secrecy and nondisclosure, however, the Court in 
Catholic Action stretched the contemplated/proposed judicially 
created exemption to a point that the distinction is now without 
meaning. Activities and projects remain "contemplated" for how-
ever long the military decides to keep their existence secret-
even though· it had been conceded by the military that such 
activities might be carried out. 
Further, exactly what Congress did intend when it enacted 
NEPA is unclear, and the Court may have granted more defer-
ance to the military than intended by Congress. The Supreme 
Court relied on FOIA Exemption 1 in holding that the Navy need 
not prepare an EIS, noting that NEPA's public disclosure re-
quirements are expressly governed by FOIA.207 Therefore, the 
COurt reasoned, Congress intended that the public's interest in 
ensuring that federal agencies comply with NEPA must give way 
to the government's need to preserve military secrets.208 It is 
unclear, however, whether NEPA's reference to FOIA was meant 
to inhibit disclosure in Exemption 1 situations or was intended 
primarily to reinforce NEPA's mandate of public disclosure. 
The CEQ, the agency created by NEPA to set out guidelines 
and regulations for agency compliance with NEPA, promulgated 
a regulation in 1978 which suggests that FOIA inhibits the disclo-
206. See supra text at notes 10-3l. 
207. 454 U.S. at 145. 
208. Id. 
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sure requirement of NEPA. The regulation permits agencies to 
safeguard, and restrict from public dissemination, proposals in 
accordance with the agencies' own regulations pertaining to 
classified information.209 The regulation allows such documents to 
be organized in such a manner as to prevent disclosure of 
classified portions, but make unclassified portions available to the 
public.210 Therefore, CEQ regulations uphold an agency's freedom 
to set out its own criteria regarding classification and disclosure, 
and essentially promulgate its own exceptions to the disclosure 
requirement of NEPA. Thus, the CEQ recognizes that FOIA 
Exemption 1 operates to inhibit the disclosure requirement of 
NEPA in certain situations. 
It could be persuasively argued, however, that NEPA's refer-
ence to FOIA was intended primarily to reinforce NEPA's public 
disclosure mandate.2l1 Proponents of this argument could point 
out that the purpose of FOIA is to clarify and protect the right of 
the public to information.212 It could be argued that the use of the 
phrase "as provided by" indicates that Congress intended that 
FOIA buttress NEPA's disclosure mandate. The Supreme Court 
in Catholic Action, however, noted that NEPA's public disclosure 
requirement is "governed by"213 and "subject to"214 the provisions 
of FOIA, implying that Congress intended the FOIA to be an 
affirmative basis for nondisclosure. 
When a federal agency proposes an action that, in the words of 
NEPA, "significantly affects the quality of the human environ-
ment,"215 but is arguably exempt from NEP A's requirements by 
virtue of FOIA Exemption 1, the goal of NEPA to ensure that 
environmental impacts are an integral part of agency decision 
making might be seriously undermined. In attempting to resolve 
the conflict between NEPA disclosure and military secrets, the 
Court in Catholic Action struck a balance that apparently favors 
the military. In light of the language ofNEPA and FOIA Exemp-
tion 1, and the discretion granted to agencies in classifying infor-
mation, perhaps the Court was bound to decide the issue in this 
209. 40 u.s.c. § 1507.4(c). 
210.Id. 
211. Tuoni,8upra note 94. The author evaluates both NEPA and FOIA as disclosure 
statutes. 
212. 112 CONGo REC. 13,641 (1966) (statement of Cong. Moss). 
213. 454 U.S. at 145. 
214. Id. at 143. 
215. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC) (1976 & Supp. v 1981). 
1984] APPLICATION OF NEPA 835 
way. Nevertheless, under the current system, the military will be 
able to avoid disclosing information about many proposals that 
pose threats to surrounding land and people. Allowing the mili-
tary such unfettered discretion in the past has resulted in abuses 
of its power to keep secrets from the public.216 Such abuse was 
evident with the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1972.217 
Further, under the Catholic Action decision, this discretion has 
been broadened significantly. Because an EIS need not even be 
prepared if the military decides that it wishes to never confirm 
the existence of a project, the military, in essence, has complete 
control over whether the potential environmental consequences 
of its activities will be subject to public scrutiny. While the need to 
protect military secrets such as the placement of nuclear missiles 
can not be disputed, where the military has acknowleged that 
certain activities might be taking place-such as when it states 
publicly that a weapons storage site under construction is "nu-
clear capable"21S-the threat to national security from public ex-
amination of the potential environmental threat which would 
arise if nuclear weapons were stored at that site is not apparent. 
The Supreme Court rejected the circuit court's holding that such 
a "hypothetical EIS" was required not because it contravened 
the military's statutory authority under NEPA to protect mili-
tary secrets, however, but because the hypothetical EIS was "a 
creature of judicial cloth, not legislative cloth."219 
Rather than settling the conflict between environmental disclo-
sure and military secrecy, the Catholic Action decision served to 
highlight the problems which arose from Congress's wholesale 
inclusion of FOIA within NEPA, without deliberate consideration 
of when the military should have unfettered discretion over envi-
ronmental disclosure decisions. Given the military's broad discre-
tion over environmental disclosure, the potential for abuse of this 
discretion, and the severe environmental harm which, in all 
likelihood, will continue to arise from military activities, revision 
of the current system of environmental disclosure of military 
activities may be warranted. 
216. Morton Halperin cites the Pentagon Papers, the secret bombing of Cambodia in 
1969-70 and the secret American intervention in Angola in 1975 as examples of this 
abuse. See M. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 5-24 for a discussion of these episodes. 
217. See M. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 5-14. 
218. 454 U.S. at 141. 
219. Id. 
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E. Proposals to Resolve the Conflict Between Environmental 
Disclosure and Military Secrecy 
NEPA's goal of public disclosure could not be satisified in 
Catholic Action because to do so would have violated the provi-
sions of FOIA. Therefore, changes may be needed in order to 
achieve the basic policy behind NEPA that all federal agencies 
incorporate environmental factors into their decision making, to 
prevent abuse of executive discretion, and to ensure adequate 
disclosure while still protecting military secrets. 
Under the present classification system, the right to classify 
information has been delegated to a very large number of officials 
in all federal agencies.220 This system has permitted and encour-
aged the withholding of vast amounts of information from the 
public.221 The threat to national security posed by the release of 
some of this information is questionable, at best. Executive Order 
No. 12356 contains no clear mandate for disclosure of any specific 
kind of information. Rather, the order grants almost complete 
discretion to the military in establishing classification guidelines. 
Congress should consider enacting standards for these guidelines. 
As part of this system, Congress should require the preparation of 
an EIS where the military has conceded the possibility that envi-
ronmentally hazardous activities will be undertaken. In addition, 
where a legitimate threat to national security would not be posed, 
the disclosure of an EIS should be required. This would provide 
maximum disclosure of potential environmental threats while 
still protecting national security secrets, and would limit the use 
of the contemplated/proposed distinction to situations where the 
distinction can reasonably be made. The system should be estab-
lished by legislation, thereby subject to legislative debate, rather 
than by executive order, so that clear, specific, and balanced 
criteria for disclosure and secrecy are enacted.222 
In addition, where no environmental disclosure is required for 
reasons of national security, Congress should consider amending 
NEPA to require that an EIS still be prepared. This would insure 
that at least one goal of NEPA-to inject environmental consid-
erations into agency decision making-will be satisfied. Addition-
220. M. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 215. Original classification authority may be 
exercised by the President; agency heads and officials designated by the President in the 
Federal Register, and officials delegated this authority pursuant to Exec. Order No. 
12356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982). 
221. M. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 215. 
222. M. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 57. See id. at 55-85 for a detailed discussion of 
proposals for a more open classification system. 
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ally, some type of internal review mechanism, perhaps by the 
CEQ, to enjoin military activities until both NEPA's procedural 
and substantive requirements have been met, would ensure that 
military agencies consider the environmental impact of their ac-
tions when such actions are not publicly disclosable. Through its 
EIS preparation and disclosure requirements, NEPA provides for 
outside review of the actions of federal agencies. Where public 
involvement is not possible in the EIS review process, an internal 
review could insure that the EIS adequately evaluates the envi-
ronmental threat posed by the military activities in question. 
The above reforms-the enactment of statutory standards for 
classification; requiring a "hypothetical EIS" where approriate; 
requiring an internal EIS where public disclosure is prohibited; 
and providing for an internal, objective review of the internal 
EIS-are offered as examples of ways in which NEPA's dual 
policies of promoting agency consideration of environmental 
hazards and providing for public consideration of those hazards 
can be advanced without needlessly sacrificing necessary protec-
tion of military secrets. The examination contained herein reveals 
that there are no easy answers to resolving the conflict between 
military secrecy and environmental disclosure. Rather, Catholic 
Action indicates that Congress should now undertake a thorough 
analysis of the policy issues raised by the application of NEPA to 
military activities. 
v. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Action is the Court's 
most recent attempt to resolve the conflict between NEPA's dis-
closure mandate and military secrecy. In holding that in con-
structing weapons storage sites the military was exempt from 
NEPA requirements, the Court relied on two factors: the distinc-
tion between a project which is "contemplated" and one which is 
"proposed"; and FOIA Exemption 1, which provides an exemption 
under which the military may completely avoid environmental 
disclosure under NEPA. FOIA Exemption for national security is 
undoubtedly necessary to protect the military's need for secrecy 
in many instances. The classification scheme embodied in the 
exemption, however, allows the military such unfettered discre-
tion with respect to what information may be classified as secret, 
that the unwarranted frustration of NEPA's goals may result. As 
suggested, a new classification system and review mechanism 
may be needed to curb military abuse in this area and to close this 
loophole. 
